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Abstract. The paper both connects and disassociates the work of Walter Benjamin and 
Aby Warburg.  There are two interrelated undertakings. The first involves the relation-
ship between philosophy and art history and thus how art history figures within the 
philosophical. The second pertains to the status of the image. Part of the argument to 
be advanced is that an engagement with philosophical approach to art history yields a 
concern with the image in which it is the image's material presence that proves deci-
sive. Indeed, it is by insisting on the object's materiality that it then becomes possible 
to locate the effective presence of the gesture as integral to the work of art. The con-
tention is that gesture is the intersection of art's material presence and the concerns 
of meaning. The paper us develop via an engagement with works by Edgar Degas and 
Luca Signorelli.
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1.
The concerns of  gesture open a setting in which both art history 
and philosophy are able to figure. These notes are situated within that 
setting1. They are part of a process of giving a philosophical account 
of gesture2. The specific project here of linking Walter Benjamin and 
1 This paper comprises elements taken from the first two lectures in a seminar 
held at Kingston University in the Centre for Research in Modern European 
Philosophy between September-December 2016. I wish to thank Professors 
Helen Hills (University of York) and Christopher Wood (New York Univer-
sity) for their comments on an earlier version. A further element of the semi-
nar, on Sophocles’ Elektra, will appear in Benjamin (2017).
2 Central to the overall project is the treatment of gesture in the work of Gior-
gio Agamben and Walter Benjamin. In regards to Agamben his two mains 
accounts occur in the texts Kommerell, or on Gesture, in Agamben (1999); 
Notes on Gesture, in Agamben (2000); Nymphs, in Agamben (2013). There is 
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Aby Warburg – a project that remains open – is 
orientated by two interrelated undertakings. The 
first involves the relationship between philosophy 
and art history and thus how art history figures 
within the philosophical3. The second pertains to 
the status of the image. Part of the argument to be 
advanced is that an engagement with the first – or 
rather a specific form of engagement with a philo-
sophical approach to art history – yields a concern 
with the image in which it is the image’s material 
presence that proves decisive. Indeed, it is by insist-
ing on the object’s materiality that it then becomes 
possible to locate the effective presence of the ges-
ture as integral to the work of art. The contention 
is that gesture is the intersection of art’s material 
presence and the concerns of meaning. While the 
gesture can be understood as the line of colour, it 
is equally the case that the gesture involves bodily 
presence. Not the body as an abstraction but the 
body as that which is given within the continuity 
of its own self-presentation. Moreover, the signifi-
cance of the concept of gesture is that it allows for 
the body as produced by art’s work, which is the 
presence of the body as the after-effect of the work 
of art, to be differentiated from the presence of the 
body within other domains. (Work here is limited 
to painting. However, painting does not delimit 
the domain of art’s work). It is the differentiation 
between the body within the work of art and other 
bodies that allows comparisons to be productive. 
Difference is only productive when maintained 
rather than effaced (thus where difference has both 
an established and insistent quality).
also an important discussion of Varro in relation to ges-
ture in his Opus Dei: see Agamben (2014). The argumen-
tation that informs this paper will serve as the basis of a 
critical response to Agamben and to his interpretation of 
Aby Warburg. This will appear as part of my: Empathy 
and Gesture, Seeing Seeing: Warburg in La cappella Sas-
setti (Forthcoming).
3 There have been many investigations of the relationship 
between Walter Benjamin and Aby Warburg. See in par-
ticular Rampley (2000), Didi-Huberman (2002), Johnson 
(2016). For an investigation of the link between Benjamin’s 
work and art history see the papers collected in Careri and 
Didi-Huberman (2015). 
Philosophy’s relation to art history is not just 
the relation between two domains of inquiry. 
Rather the concern is to think the term history 
with the formulation art history as a philosophical 
topos in the first instant and then, in the second, 
to try and think art and thus art’s self presence as 
art also as a philosophical topos rather than as a 
historical or sociological one. This means allowing 
both of these terms – “history”, “sociology” – their 
own register, whilst holding them apart from the 
philosophical. What continues to endure is the 
problem of what is at stake in thinking art’s his-
tory philosophically. Integral to this project are 
works from the history of art. (Note again the 
project here is not just thinking art philosophi-
cally, which is the inevitable Hegelian legacy, 
but art’s history philosophically). Once there is 
a fracturing of time that displaces the insistence 
of and on chronology, and this is a position that 
arises, at least at the outset, as much within the 
work of Aby Warburg as it does Walter Benjamin, 
then there is no need to hold to a philosophical 
endeavour that would be delimited by and thus 
seek to fetishize the contemporary and its works. 
Indeed, the word “contemporary” would then 
begin to lose its explanatory force if it were identi-
fied with a single chronological marker. In regards 
to the relationship between the image and time 
and thus the project of thinking art history as a 
philosophical topos a direction is suggested by the 
following position advanced by Benjamin. In The-
sis V from The Concept of History the relationship 
between historical time and the image is formulat-
ed in terms that give rise to a specific task:
For every image of the past that is not recognized by 
the present as one of its own concerns threatens to 
disappear irretrievably (Benjamin [2010]: 390-391). 
At work here is the insistence of the past and 
thus a conception of the “past” as integral to the 
present’s constitution. The past becomes a condi-
tion of the present; reciprocally, of course, the pre-
sent is defined as implicated in its own past. While 
this opens up the question of time such that it can 
be reconfigured in terms of a relation between the 
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past and the present as constitutive of the pre-
sent – the naturalization of historical time, and by 
extension philosophical naturalism, are undone 
in advance – what still has to be addressed is the 
quality of the image when this image can be iden-
tified with the work of art4. 
If there is a philosophical point of orientation 
that allows the particularity of the image as the 
work of art to be developed then, while it is not 
directly Hegelian if that were to mean that the let-
ter of Hegel’s position had to be followed in terms 
of examples or the detail of argumentation, it is 
nonetheless still Hegel’s. Note the following claim 
made at the beginning of his Lectures on Fine Art: 
What is now aroused in us by works of art is not 
just immediate enjoyment but at the same time 
[zugleich] our judgment [Urteil] also, since we sub-
ject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content of 
art [Inhalt], and (ii) the work of art’s means of pres-
entation [Darstellungsmittel des Kuntswerks], and the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness [Angemessenheit 
und Unangemessenheit] of both to one another. The 
philosophy of art is therefore a greater need [Bedür-
fnis] in our day than it was in days when art by itself 
as art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intel-
lectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of 
creating art again, but for knowing philosophically 
what art is (Hegel, Vol. II [1998]: 25). 
What is significant about Hegel’s formulation 
is not just the addition of judgement [Urteil] to 
the presence of what he describes in a way that is 
clearly meant to recall Kant as «immediate enjoy-
ment», it is rather that the move to judgment 
entails the addition of criteria of judgment. (There 
cannot be one without the other). This, the argu-
ment will be, is a major point. Criteria of judg-
ment are not there as an addition made uniquely 
by Hegel, indeed it might be argued that the pres-
4 While it is always possible to conceive of the “image” in 
its differentiation from the work of art, the history of the 
image as evidenced terminologically cannot be usefully 
disassociated from the history of art. The philosophical 
question therefore concerns understanding this particular 
nexus. For an important overview of the concerns central 
to this project see the texts in Alloa (2010). 
ence of criteria of judgement becomes an instance 
of the location of evaluation within any think-
ing of the image that is delimited as being the 
work of art. Hegel’s formulation is precise. They 
are not a mere supplement to pleasure. There is 
a specific thinking of those criteria. It pertains 
to what is described in terms of «appropriate-
ness or inappropriateness [Angemessenheit und 
Unangemessenheit]»5. What is at stake here is a 
relation. Before pursuing this particular inscription 
of criterion of judgment it might be added, if only 
in passing, that Kant’s attempt to separate enjoy-
ment from judgment could be understood as the 
exception. Indeed, it might be conjectured further 
that the history of the image has always involved 
the attempt to link, perhaps to interarticulate, the 
image’s presence with coterminous criteria of judg-
ment. (While the content of those criteria may 
vary and the examples used to sustain them may 
be radically distinct, as an abstract immanent con-
dition the presence of those conditions accompa-
nies any sustained thinking of the image).
Before pursuing this point the other element 
of Hegel’s formulation that will be central to this 
undertaking also needs to be noted. It is essential 
5 A clear instance of what can be described as the concep-
tion of philosophical criticism – the thinking of art – can 
be located in Hegel’s evaluation of Guido Renni’s Assump-
tion of Mary. For Hegel in this work what he identifies 
earlier in the Lectures as «mannerism» is particularized. 
Here it is located in the position of the eyes. She looks 
down. Hegel writes the following: «In Guido Reni, for 
instance, it has become a mannerism of his to give his 
figures this look and raising of the eyes. His Assumption 
of Mary, in the Munich gallery, for example, has won the 
highest fame from friends and connoisseurs of art, and 
certainly it has a supreme effect in the lofty glory of the 
transfiguration, the immersion and dissolving of the soul 
in heaven, and in the entire attitude of a figure hovering 
aloft in heaven, as well as in the clarity and beauty of the 
colour. Nevertheless I find it less satisfactory for Mary 
[aber ich finde es für Maria dennoch angemessener] than 
when she is portrayed in her present love and bliss as she 
has her eye on her child. The longing and striving in her 
look towards heaven borders too nearly on modern sen-
timentalism [die Sehnsucht, das Streben, jener Blick gen 
Himmel streifen nahe an die modern Empfindsamkeit her-
an]» (Hegel, Vol. 1[1998]: 57-59).
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to underscore that Hegel is not just concerned 
with criteria of evaluation or judgment. Of equal 
centrality is the work’s presentation and then the 
work’s «content [Inhalt]». That presentation, the 
process that is the content’s presentation, is named 
by Hegel as «the work of art’s means of presenta-
tion [Darstellungsmittel des Kuntswerks]» and as a 
result what is brought to the fore is the necessity 
of holding to the work as a material object whose 
objectivity can be redescribed in terms of the 
workful nature of materials. The «mittel» marks 
the ineliminability of material and thus materi-
ality. The material is that through which or in 
terms of which presentation occurs. Emphasizing 
the centrality of materiality indicates, and this is 
fundamental to the force of Hegel’s position, that 
there cannot be mere presentation as though all 
that mattered was the presence of content which 
would then entail that content could be held apart 
from its means of presentation. They are held 
apart in order to allow their relation to be a site 
of activity and a locus of judgment. An account of 
presentation demands that attention be paid to the 
«means» or medium. Nor equally, if Hegel’s for-
mulation were allowed to sustain the force of its 
original formulation, can there then be an effac-
ing of those «means». Such a possibility is there, 
by implication in Kant. It inheres in the formula-
tion of a response to the art work’ in terms of the 
«immediate». Kant in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment when identifying the particularity of 
the subjective representation of the purposive-
ness of an object argues that it depends upon the 
«immediate pleasure in the form of the object 
in mere reflection» (Kant [2000]: 78). This is the 
position that reduces the object to that which is 
given within, and only within, a structure of pleas-
ure. Hence it comprises the position against which 
Hegel is writing. Pleasure is premised on the obvi-
ation of thought as a necessary form of mediation. 
Hence it is premised on an impossibility. Immedi-
acy is not just the refusal of mediation. As signifi-
cantly, it is the refusal of the possibility of attribut-
ing a position within a philosophical thinking of 
the work of art to the means or the medium [mit-
tel] as that through which, or as which, art stag-
es its own project (and thus as that within which 
thinking occurs. In other words, form is always 
informed). From Hegel’s perspective, and thus 
pace Kant, content’s presentation has to be thought 
in relation to the «means» or «medium [mittel]» 
that is art’s presentation. 
A number of elements are in play here. They 
account for the significance of Hegel’s formula-
tion. In the first instance, there is the centrality 
of «means» or «medium» as the presentation of 
content. Remembering that «content [Inhalt]» is 
Hegel’s actual term. Then, secondly, there is the 
interconnection of that staging with the pres-
ence of explicit or implicit criteria of judgment. 
The point has already been made that these cri-
teria need to be understood as a structural pres-
ence insofar as they are work’s abstract grounds 
of comprehensibility; i.e. its presence as a locus of 
thought. Determined content and thus the specific 
occur within this setting. Hegel’s use of a formula-
tion that involves the «appropriate» and the «inap-
propriate» becomes his version of naming that 
content and thus giving a specific determination 
to those criteria. Hegel is of course not the only 
thinker that accords a form of recognition to the 
material. In the Eikones [Imagines] of Philostratus 
(190 CE) art’s materiality is addressed in terms 
of its «plasticity». However, plasticity cannot be 
understood as an end in itself. Indeed, Philostra-
tus distinguishes between all the different «plastic 
arts» in terms of their relation to specific forms of 
material. Painting, as a plastic art, for Philostratus, 
works «from colour (ἐκ χρωμάτων)» (Philostra-
tus [1931]: 1.17). Colour therefore is that through 
which content is presented. Equally, that presenta-
tion is regulated by the way in which ekphrasis as 
a mode of presentation is understood and yields 
regulative criteria in advance. Here a place within 
the history of the image is again defined in terms 
of the recognition of the workful yet regulated 
nature of the work’s material presence. 
There is a specific conclusion that can be 
drawn here.  Namely, that if all that were taken to 
be central is art’s presentation of the body’s move-
ment – the movement of the body taken as an end 
in itself – then, as a consequence, what fails to be 
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thought is the interplay of presentation under-
stood as a complex of relations in which both 
the material and the ideational figure. Once this 
complex is granted priority then the conjecture is 
always going to be that gesture is not just a form 
of presentation. On the contrary, gesture cannot 
be separated from its Darstellungsmittel and that 
mittel is always located within a complex network 
of signification that is bound up with criteria of 
judgment (the latter as an immanent condition 
and thus as a continual reference to the inelimina-
bility of ideational content). It is that content that 
is integral to what might be described as any one 
art work’s ineliminable potential to be judged – its 
judgeability. The work, any one work, is a network 
and thus it is always more than one. While a net-
work, it is not closed. On the contrary, it is in a 
continual state of construction and thus always 
open to radical reconstruction. The static and the 
given cede their place to both relationality and 
potentiality. (This is the setting in which a work’s 
afterlife can be located). As a result the singular 
– be it either the single gesture or the single work 
– only ever occurs within a network and thus a 
singularity is only ever the after-effect of the dis-
continuous processes of coming-into-relation. The 
singular is always secondary. A relation precedes 
it. In other words, what always obtains is relation-
ality as an original condition. Hence there is ano-
riginal relationality6. 
2.
In order to begin with gesture, it should be 
clear that such a beginning means that gesture, 
whilst awaiting definition, is always more than 
the movement of hands, or the movement of the 
body. The question to be addressed, were this to 
be accepted as a point of departure, pertains to 
6 The concept is to think of the anoriginal as an irreduc-
ible relation that pertains originally. The anoriginal marks 
a sense of relationality that is always the site of a found-
ing irreducibility. For the development of this position 
as general philosophical argument see Benjamin (1993), 
(2015), (2015a).
this “more”. How is this “more” to be understood? 
While there is always that which is there in excess 
of the body’s own movement – an excess locat-
ed within the interplay of the ideational and the 
material, what can be descried as the work’s mat-
tering – opening gesture up to a set of considera-
tions delimited by the “more” will turn principally 
around two works of art (though each work has 
its own setting, i.e. context on the one hand, and 
relations both present and to come, on the other). 
As a result the “more” is the excess which allows 
a work’s material presence not be reduced to its 
empirical presence. Empiricism cannot account 
for a work’s intrinsic conceptuality and thus its 
capacity to be judged. Centrality will be given 
here to works in which what figures – though this 
description is far from adequate – is the body, or 
more exactly the body’s movement. The first is a 
painting by Degas, Dancer adjusting the strap of 
her bodice (Figure 1). The second is a work by 
Figure 1
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Luca Signorelli, Comunione degli Apostoli, current-
ly located in Cortona (Figure 2)7. 
While there is always historical specificity, if 
historical time is identified with chronology, such 
an insistence can be put to one side once what 
matters is the body’s presentation. Though there 
is the related question of how the mattering of the 
body is itself to be understood8. The latter ques-
tion is one that recognises that what is at stake is 
the work of art and thus that the body’s presen-
tation in art is an effect of the work of materials. 
Consistent with what has already been suggested 
the argument is always going to be that there is 
never just the body within the work of art. While 
it will be essential to continue to return to this 
7 For a discussion of this work within the context of 
Signorelli’s work as a whole see Henry (2012): 270-75. 
Jonathan B. Riess has written an important study of the 
image of the Jew in Signorelli’s Orvieto Frescoes. What is 
significant is the link between direct and indirect depic-
tions of the Christian presence in relation to the Jewish 
one. See Riess (1995).
8 For a detailed discussion of the concept of mattering see 
Benjamin (2015a).
position, what has to be noted is the continuity of 
art not just as a question but also equally as the 
locus of the body. Even though the paintings and 
drawings may be of bodies that dance and sing, 
thus they are presentations of the body as spe-
cific and already situated forms of movement, it 
remains the case that the inscription of the body, 
the body‘s presentation, is within, and as, the work 
of art. The body has to resist that mode of abstrac-
tion that undoes the particularity of mattering. 
Here, as an opening, the point of departure is 
provided by works by Degas. Art’s work becomes 
therefore that which is present and which presents 
itself through the means proper to it. The point 
remains; propriety here is as much material as it 
is ideational. Their interplay is the body figuring; 
again its mattering.
To begin therefore: the history of gesture 
begins with the body. In Quintilian’s Institutio 
Oratoria gesture is described as that which can 
convey meaning «without the hold of words». 
(The importance of the history of rhetoric is that 
integral to it is a clear attempt to define the body 
as a locus of meaning). The passage cited below 
concerning Demosthenes further reinforces the 
relationship between the body and gesture:
Decorum […] comes from gesture and movement 
[Decor (...) a gestu atque motu venit]. This why Dem-
osthenes used to plan his performance in front of 
a big mirror, despite the fact that the bright surface 
reverses the image, he had complete trust in his own 
eyes’ ability to tell him what effect he was making9. 
There are a number of significant elements in 
this formulation, and it should be remembered 
that it is a formulation that is fundamental to the 
history of rhetoric in terms of the way that «deco-
9 Quintilian (2001): 11.3.68. For a general account of the 
history of Roman gesture see Aldrete (1999). For a more 
precise analysis of Quintilian and his relation to the writ-
ings of Cicero on the same topic see Hall (May 2004). 
For an important discussion of the relationship between 
decorum and limits that, while engaging Quintilian’s 
work, ranges more widely, see Platt (2014).
Figure 2
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rum» is linked to «gesture and movement» such 
that it is impossible, as will be suggested, to extri-
cate gesture from either a positive or negative rela-
tion to decorum. The next interpretive point that 
needs to be introduced is the following: Precisely 
because the media differ there cannot be a direct 
movement between works on rhetoric, whose 
locus of concern is the role of the body within 
speech making and the art of persuasion on the 
one hand, and the work of art as a material pres-
ence on the other. The language and terminology 
of gesture is central to the former and hence the 
relation between rhetoric and the work of art can 
be mutually informative to the extent that what 
is maintained is a complementarity of distance. 
In the rush to attribute a connection between the 
history of rhetoric and the history of art it may be 
that the defining material differences are effaced. 
The exigency of distance is essential in order to 
maintain the particularity of art’s work as a locus 
of thought.
It is important that what is at work in this 
beginning, namely tracing gesture’s presence 
within the history of rhetoric, is acknowledged. 
Quintilian’s formulation concerning gesture yields 
a question: What does Demosthenes see when 
he looks into the mirror? Staring whilst rendered 
mute by a mouthful of pebbles. Prior to engaging 
with this question, it needs to be noted that the 
reception of Demosthenes was equivocal. Plutarch, 
for example, was highly critical (Plutarch [1919]). 
Quintilian however described him as amongst the 
best of all («inter omnis unus excellat»). What is 
significant in Quintilian’s formulation is that what 
Demosthenes sees in the mirror, and this despite 
a form of inversion, is not just his body. There is 
also the capacity to see in the body’s movement 
the effect that he wished to make. It is not just 
that the body is a supplement to meaning. More 
emphatically, it is the body and the body’s move-
ment that is the locus of meaning. What the eye 
sees is the body; what is felt is the body’s own. 
One possible conjecture might be therefore that 
the body is all that appears and thus could be 
taken as an end itself. This is however the point of 
contestation. Since were this to be the case, were 
the body able to function as an end in itself, then 
meaning comes to be coterminous with the body’s 
movement because movement would have a sin-
gular quality. What is both seen and felt would be 
one. More significantly, it would need to be one. 
The presupposition there would be that both the 
movement and its observations would be singular. 
Moreover, that singularity would be presupposed 
if the response were to be explicated in terms of 
empathy. 
In fact, Demosthenes was after an accord 
between word and body. And yet, what continues 
to be there is not just the question of the extent to 
which that movement can be taken as an end itself 
structured in terms of a singular presence enjoin-
ing a singular response, where the latter could 
be understand in terms of empathy, rather what 
becomes important once a turn is made to Degas 
or Signorelli, and thus by extension art works, 
is the presence of a radically different body. It is 
already clear that Demosthenes’ body had to be 
the site of specific meanings and not meaning as 
such. What Quintilian recognizes is the informed 
nature of Demosthenes’ body. It was already both 
itself and a site meaning. (Demosthenes, it might 
be conjectured, already knew this).
Demosthenes’ project, as reported by Quin-
tilian, was situated in relation to a mirror. On 
one level the mirror is art’s phantasy; a phantasy 
exposed as such and then undone in advance by 
the necessity of meaning – what would have been 
reflection – occurring as an after-effect of the work 
of materials. Materials in the place of the now sus-
pended set of possibilities, the phantasy of pure 
reflection, opened as much by the mirror as it does 
by mirroring. As though Butades’ daughter had 
not really existed, Alberti’s grounding of the incep-
tion of art in the figure of Narcissus becomes a 
fundamental instance of the way mirroring – one 
with its own set of material possibilities – plays a 
productive role10. And yet, there is no real sense 
10 Alberti argues that Narcissus’ gaze is integral to the ori-
gin of painting. In his De Pictura he writes the following: 
«Quid est enim aliud pingere qua arte superficiem illam 
fontis ampllecti? (What therefore is painting if not to 
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of unanimity in regards to how reflection is to be 
understood. Reflection pluralizes. Rather than 
enjoining a structure of simultaneity it may be 
understood as a process of pluralization. Medea 
stands before the mirror11. As she stands, she 
acts. Her body has a doubled presence. A dou-
bling provided by a «mirror». Euripides writes that 
she «arranged her hair in a bright mirror, smil-
ing at the lifeless [ἄψυχον] image of her body» 
(Euripides [1994]: 1162). What is reflected has 
become inanimate. This is the mirror’s other pos-
sibility. Nonetheless, in both instances the body is 
now the produced after-effect. The body, though it 
is always bodies, Medea is not Narcissus, neither is 
she Demosthenes, are produced. The body as a fig-
ure within the history of both rhetoric and writing 
on art is a pluralized site. The excess, that which 
is there within gesture, there holding the gesture 
(thus the body) apart from any reduction to a 
singular site, indicates not only that the form, the 
gesture or the body as form, is always informed, 
it is equally the case that what the informed will 
acquire has a different form of presentation (the 
latter is, of course, Hegel’s Darstellungsmittel des 
Kuntswerks) in the case of writing as opposed to 
art. The sensitivity within writing to colour, which 
is apparent in thinkers as diverse as Philostratus 
and Hegel, is of course sensitivity to the way that 
art works in its differentiation from writing. This is 
an instance of the differences that are essential to 
maintain. The play of difference brings with it an 
attendant risk. The differences are ground in mate-
rial possibility. All of which would become ineffec-
tive were there any simple identification with the 
language and thought of rhetoric with art’s work. 
The complementarity of distance needs to endure.
3.
If there were a way of locating the importance 
of the writings of Aby Warburg and Walter Ben-
embrace with art the surface of a fountain?)» (1.26). See 
Grayson (1972).
11 On the more general question of mirroring in works of 
art see Benjamin (1993a): 4-62. 
jamin within the larger concern of approaching 
art’s history as a domain of philosophical inquiry 
it occurs – at least at the outset – at the precise 
point at which singularity and empathy as provid-
ing a way into art’s work breaks down. That break 
arises once it can be argued that the produced 
nature of any singularity precludes the possibility 
of empathy being anything other than an arbitrary 
and thus inherently partisan response that while 
not predicated upon it, nonetheless remains indif-
ferent to art’s material presence and thus fails to 
think gesture’s presentation as an after-effect. 
In looking at the nature of the connection 
between antique imagery and Botticelli’s paintings 
Birth of Venus and Spring Warburg argues that:
It is possible to trace, step by step, how the artist and 
their “advisers” recognized “the antique” as a model 
that demanded intensification of outward movement 
[äussere Bewegung] and how they turned to antique 
sources whenever accessory forms – those of gar-
ments and hair – were to be represented in motion 
[bewegten Beiwerks] (Warburg [1999]:89; [2010]: 39).
Note that what is at stake here is the presence 
of a «model» as a way of understanding move-
ment; the presence of the moving body as the 
work of art. What reappears is the movement of 
the body and thus what is effected by the body’s 
movement. Moving between antique and Renais-
sance images there is a type of affinity, of accord, 
a similarity of movement even though there could 
be a clash or divergence on the level of meaning. 
Edgar Wind in addressing this phenomenon notes 
that on the Donatello pulpit in the Basilica di 
San Lorenzo in Florence «the pagan figure of the 
dancing maenad […] is  transformed into a Mary 
Magdalene moaning under the Cross». Again, in 
Wind’s formulation, what is involved here is a set 
up in which «similar gestures can assume opposite 
meanings» (Wind [July 1937]: 70-71)12. This is a 
12 Equally, of course, Donatello created a work that is now 
known as the Penitent Magdalene (1457). See Bernay and 
Rafanelli (2015): 72, who describe the figure under the 
cross in the following terms: «a once beautiful woman 
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possibility of considerable significance. Two ques-
tions emerge here. Firstly, how is this transforma-
tion and thus the presence of «opposite mean-
ings» to be understood? Secondly, and clearly 
relatedly, there is the question of the relationship 
between meaning (taken as both a singular and 
plural occurrence) and, to use Warburg’s formu-
lation, «motion». Wind cites, as noted, the Dona-
tello pulpit, a work to which Warburg has already 
alluded13. Warburg argues that in works such as 
these, «Italian sculpture rediscovered the ancient 
pathosformel of the language of gestures [die antik-
en Pathosformeln der Gebärdensprache wiederent-
deckte]» (Warburg [2010]: 282). Attention to the 
work’s details makes it clear that her upturned 
arms have the effect of eroticising her body. Atten-
tion is drawn, as a result and as integral to the 
work’s work, to the freedom of her breasts beneath 
her tunic. The play of light upon the work’s sur-
face facilitated by its presence as a relief under-
pins these possibilities. Indeed, it is possible to 
go further and argue that were it not for the way 
that light works upon the surface, thus were it not 
for the construction of the surface as a relief, the 
body’s eroticisation would not have occurred. This 
is the work’s mattering. In other words, it is not 
the presence of the gesture, nor just the inform-
ing of form, that are central. That presence needs 
to be reformulated. The gesture, which is also the 
work of materials, sustains both her presence as 
Mary Magdalene though equally and at the same 
time her presence as an erotic figure14. The body is 
ravaged by her stay in the wilderness, veiled only in her 
long hair, nearly consumed by her own love of Christ». 
13 For a more general interpretation of the sources for the 
pulpits, one that does not interpret them in terms of «the 
inspiration of antiquity», see Lavin (March 1959). For 
an interpretation of the figures that concurs with Wind 
in relation to Mary Magdalene but which interprets the 
scenes more generally in terms of the history of theatrical 
staging see Verdon (1986).
14 There are of course accounts of the presence of the 
ancient forms of figuration within Renaissance works. 
The face becomes more complex when it is argued that 
what has an after life is the ancient theatrical mask rather 
than a literal human figure. To this end see, for example, 
the argument made by Moshe Barash in relation to the 
doubled. There is a complex interrelation in which 
one presence marks the other. This is an instance 
of what will continue to be developed as the dou-
bling of gesture. Though a saintly figure the use 
of the «antique» model linked her directly to a 
follower of Dionysus. Her ecstatic presence can 
always resist balance. The erotic, as an inescap-
able possibility, inescapable as it could always have 
been seen, redefines her undecidability. Its poten-
tiality is sustained. It is, of course, an undecidabil-
ity that has as much an effect on the status (thus 
deployment) of the historical, as it works to rein-
force the point noted above that there is always 
more than just the movement of the body. The 
presence of the ecstatic here cannot be singular. 
Hence allowing empathy to structure any response 
would have been undone from the start. Here it 
is important to note that for Warburg empathy 
depends upon the accuracy of Vischer’s account 
of both the subject and the object being «a unity 
in multiplicity [eine Einheit in Vielheit]». Their 
relationship and thus movement between them 
depends upon this designation. Note the follow-
ing description of the «soul» and its relation to the 
object: 
If the soul feels something thereby, namely, desire, 
aesthetic desire, it can only be because the soul itself, 
with its nerves and entire body, is a unity in multi-
plicity and it rediscovers itself where it finds the same 
[eine Einheit in Vielheit ist und sich da wiederfindet, 
wo sie solche findet] (Vischer [2015]: 7:4, 417-448).
To the extent that doubling can be maintained 
and that doubling resits its reduction to a unity, 
even to a unity within a unified polarity, empa-
thy’s very condition of possibility would no longer 
obtain. In the Fragment on the Nympha, despite 
the complexity of both analytic discussion and 
biographical intrusion, the nymph is described 
as the one who «brought life and movement into 
Laocoön: «Facial configuration of the faces in the Lao-
coön can be traced back to masks. Faces in this work 
and in them are all “animated tragic masks”. The face of 
the Laocoön becomes the model of the suffering Christ» 
(Barash (1991): 64).
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another wise calm representation [die Leben und 
Bewgung brachte, in sonst ruhige Vorstellung]» 
(Warburg [2010]: 202)15. While she remains essen-
tially at odds with her context – Warburg’s ques-
tion endures: «Is this strangely delicate plant 
really rooted in the sober Florentine soil?» – her 
presence does not unbalance the given (Agamben 
[2010]: 203). On the contrary, it allows the Nachle-
ben der Antike to account for different modalities 
of balance; modalities to which that «afterlife» 
both contributes and sustains. The nymph could 
never be an «indiscernible thing», as Agamben 
has it, precisely because the movement that she 
stages is itself informed and that her gestures are 
themselves only meaningful in their relation of 
non-relation to the gestures that accompanies 
her (Agamben [2013]). Vibrancy and calm are 
held together in their differences. One working 
with the other: again this would be the doubling 
of gesture. Ghirlandaio’s painting of the servant 
girl (as nymph) in the fresco Birth of the Baptist 
in Tornabuoni Chapel is positioned and mean-
ingful because of the play of informed forces that 
hold her in opposition to the three other women 
directly to her left. (It might even be argued as a 
result that movement cannot be thought as singu-
lar). Wind will argue that «the most violent con-
flicts are reconciled» giving rise to what he called, 
in tune with Warburg, «a psychology of equilib-
rium [Ausgleichpsychologie]», and which Warburg 
identifies as plastische Ausgleichformel (plastic for-
mulae of balance/reconciliation). To which there is 
a response; one that accepts the viability of their 
insights. The response has to concede that there is 
indeed a doubling. In turn this means, as a conse-
quence, that any reconciliation is a created singu-
larity, which, even if it pertained, would always be 
tenuous16. Reconciliation can be posited. Its suc-
cess is always another question. A doubled pres-
ence would always endure, marking the singular 
from the start. Hence, again, the question returns: 
With what – with what singularity, the singu-
15 On the problem of the particularity of nymphs and 
maenads in the context of Greek art see, Hedreen (1994). 
16 See Wind (1993). See also Warburg (1999): 262.
larity of art’s work – would empathy have ever 
occurred? The importance of this question can be 
found in the way the relation between subject and 
object – viewer and viewed – is presented by War-
burg in terms of empathy. 
Warburg’s formulation concerning both a 
rediscovery and then a form of incorporation can 
be further examined by returning to the open-
ing of Quintilian’s formulation. To recall the line, 
Quintilian wrote: «Decorum […] comes from ges-
ture and movement [Decor (...) a gestu atque motu 
venit]». The point that has to be noted at the out-
set is that «decorum» results from their presence. 
What this means of course is that «decorum» is 
enacted. Which is to say that «decorum» is there 
within the «gesture and the movement». Even if 
in the end one absorbs the other. Gestures move, 
and movement figures as gesture. In other words, 
decorum is not there as an additional quality, as 
though there were gestures and then there was 
decorum. This recalls, of course, what is inherent 
in Hegel’s arguments concerning the «appropriate» 
and the «inappropriate». Value is always already 
at work. Criteria of judgment are inscribed from 
the start even if they are subject to revision. The 
point that is implicit in Quintilian’s formulation 
is far more emphatic. The gestures and the move-
ment are not secondary. Hence there is an already 
present set of connections between «decorum» 
and «gesture and movement». As will be seen it is 
these connections that have to be pursued. Hence 
a return needs to be made both to the detail of 
Quintilian’s formulation and what is at work in the 
direct reference to Demosthenes. 
The insistence of the body occurs later in the 
same section of Quintilian’s text when the hands 
are described as «the common language [com-
munis sermo] of the human race»17. Within the 
common there are two type of gesture. The first 
are described as the «natural voicing of words», 
while the second is where «things [res] are signi-
fied by imitation [imitatione]». In both instances 
what is at stake are forms of expression or pres-
entation in which, even though movement itself 
17 Quintilian (2001): 11.3.87.
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is the signifying element, there cannot be just 
movement. The question of limitations and thus 
the interplay of the «appropriate» and the «inap-
propriate», to recall Hegel, all need to be pursued. 
There is an interesting problem insofar as the sin-
gular status that informs Quintilian and which is 
in part repeated by Hegel, is that which is called 
into question by the impossibility of the singu-
lar gesture engendering an empathetic response. 
(The impossibility of the singular renders such a 
response merely putative). 
Note the problems identified by a specific 
modality of bodily movement; i.e. the use of a 
«shrug» or the hunching of the shoulders. Quintil-
ian wrote:
Rarely is it becoming [decens] to shrug or hunch the 
shoulders because this shortens the neck and produces 
a gesture [gestem] of humiliation or servility, because 
people use it when they are pretending to flatter [adu-
lationis], admire or fear18.
Not only does a passage of this nature indi-
cate that there cannot be such an action – or even 
a set of actions – that warrants, or allows for the 
description of gesture as such. (The use of the 
term «servility» betrays the absence of either neu-
trality or singularity, hence «servility» names the 
original inscription of value). What can be noted 
therefore in the use of the terminology of «deco-
rum» or the «becoming» is what has already been 
identified in terms of criteria of judgment. Here 
the «shrug» «produces a gesture» that has to be 
thought as indecorous. Even if that position were 
contested and as a consequence it were to be 
argued that the «shrug» had a different quality, lit-
tle changes, since such a move simply reinforces 
the point that the shrug is always overdetermined. 
Bodily movement, which is named here as «ges-
ture», is located within a complex network of sig-
nification. 
What follows from the above is that gesture 
cannot be understood – at least thus far – oth-
18 Quintilian (2001): 11.3.83. In regards to the question of 
flattery see the presence of the same topos of concern in 
Plutarch’s Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur.
er than in terms of the presentation of meaning 
that brings a sense of value into play. (And here 
it should be added that to the extent that there is 
a coincidence between meaning and use, mean-
ing is inevitable bound up with value). While the 
value in question – its nature, quality, etc. – may 
be contestable, value and thus contestability have 
an insistent presence ab initio. This form of pres-
ence calls into question both the neutrality and 
singularity of any gesture. Once this position 
is allowed then it demands that recognition be 
paid to what Hegel identified as Darstellungsmit-
tel. Presentation, its potentially doubled quality, 
takes place. That in which it occurs, what allows 
for its occurrence cannot be separated from the 
process itself. Moreover, what also follows from 
the presence of what Warburg and Wind would 
have referred to as the «antique» within and as 
the modern is that time takes on a complex qual-
ity. In terms of its temporal nature any singular 
instance is always more than one. As a result, what 
comes to be affirmed is what has already been 
described as anoriginal relationality.  Moreover, 
it is the presence of an irreducibility that pertains 
from the start that that indicates the implausibility 
of assuming that reconciliation or equilibrium are 
unproblematic results. This mode of irreducibility 
and relationality opens the way towards the devel-
opment of the conception of gesture that occurs 
in the writings of Walter Benjamin. Rather than 
evoke Benjamin directly, his work will emerge 
via a consideration of the two paintings that have 
already been identified, namely Degas’ Dancer 
adjusting the strap of her bodice and the Comun-
ione degli Apostoli painted by Luca Signorelli in 
approximately 1512.
4. 
That Degas returned to the body both human 
and animal underscored his recognition that 
the body had a vibrancy that overcame any pos-
sible reduction to that which presented itself to 
mere seeing and as yielding the singular object 
that is empathy’s precondition. His famous Sonnet 
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addressed to the singer Rose Caron already staked 
out the force of the gesture: 
Si mes yeux se perdaient, que me durât l’ouïe,
Au son, je pourrais voir le geste qu’elle fait 
(Degas [1946]). 
Within central elements of Degas’ work the 
arm, its relation to the face and the hand, were a 
continual site of activity. An earlier work – Stud-
ies of a Singer (1878-80) – is a drawing (Figure 3). 
The work is present therefore as either preliminary 
or as a form of experimentation. Raised thereby 
is of course the question of the preliminary and 
thus of drawing. In the drawing the singer’s arm 
is raised. The singer gestures. To be clear, there is 
a literal gesture. The raised arm is simply that. Is 
this the gesture as such? The as such founders once 
detail is allowed to insist. The creases on her palm 
indicate that her hand is only partially closed. 
Moreover, the positioning of the fingers reinforc-
es the partiality of the closure. Drawn into both 
therefore is time. Time is there in the lines and the 
folds. The fold marks the now and yet folded into 
the lines is the tension that attends release. The 
raised hand draws attention to her face. It allows 
for the possibility that she is singing or has just 
sung. The raising of her hand would therefore – as 
an act, as the literal gesture – move attention away 
from the hand and towards her face. The gesture 
– if the hand and arm can be understood as a 
gesture, remembering that what is at stake at this 
stage is the literal gesture there in its opening up, 
an opening up in which the literal gesture if taken 
as an end in itself, as that which is the gesture as 
such, will be shown to have been always already 
impossible – works to open the face. It works by 
moving attention from the hand/arm to the face. 
As the arm/hand acts, an act in which there is an 
interconnected upward movement, that act posi-
tions the face as a locus of activity. Her mouth is 
open. Held in place is the now in which the face 
sings. Taken together these elements move the 
eye and thus a concern with drawing towards the 
activity of singing. It is not, of course, reducible or 
explicable in terms of a space that has been cre-
ated. It is there. However, it comes to be seen as 
a result of what began as literal gesture. This is 
the work of the body. Here therefore the gesture 
opens. Folded into its lines is time as the inter-
play of the now and potentiality. Now the hand 
also opens a space. Henceforth, the gesture can-
not be separated from what it effects. The gestures 
become this opening up. And yet the gesture itself 
is not a pure allowing. 
In the painting entitled Dancer adjusting 
the strap of her bodice (1885-1905) two women 
appear. The raised arm is there. One woman fac-
es away from the viewer. She is standing at the 
back of the painting. The other, while closer to the 
viewer, looks down. She creates the foreground 
to the woman standing at the back of the paint-
ing. The woman in question looks out.  Looking 
out into the back of the painting. Looking out, 
she looks into what should be understood as the 
painting’s creation of the public realm. She ges-
tures within it. She is gesturing to that world. 
This is the world that is created and recreated by 
a gesture that has to be seen publicly. Within the 
world of the painting she is being seen publicly. 
Her body moves therefore within a public domain. 
The meaning of her gesture is to be located with-
in it. It occurs within it; occurring by sustaining 
Figure 3
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that within which it occurs. The public gesture 
becomes what it is because of the world that solic-
its and thus which the gesture then recreates. 
The strip of orange behind the other dancer is 
the divide between the two worlds; public and pri-
vate. A holding apart which allows these worlds, 
these worlds of gesture, to be presented together. 
Gesture doubles.  It is a separation, thus a relation 
of non-relation, that sustains meaning. The sepa-
ration and their connection are equally an effect 
of the colour orange. (This may be the presence of 
colour as itself a form of gesture). As a result of 
the spaces produced by the orange strip the public 
is divided from the private. And yet both are dis-
played. A divide occurs. There are two places. One 
is on the stage and the other off it. There are two 
modes of gesture. The first occurs on stage and 
is therefore public – in public it creates the pub-
lic – and the other off stage and therefore private. 
The latter is disclosed in a world that it discloses. 
The public gesture therefore is the opening to the 
public. It is publicly open. The other however is 
not simply private; or, more accurately, is not just 
private. Indeed, its clarity allows it to evince an 
almost intimate air. Two distinct domains of ges-
ture appear therefore. The woman – the dancer 
– at the back, who is, of course, at the front, ges-
tures, literally, into the public realm. The other 
dancer, though for the painting’s viewers she is 
far more prominent, gently moves the straps of 
her gown. The delicacy and intimate nature of the 
gesture is reinforced by the clear intensity of her 
stare, the way her fingers are positioned in rela-
tion to the thinness of the strap itself. Here the 
drawn lines mark intimacy. She is enclosed within 
a world and thus she has become oblivious to any 
other world. 
Again it needs to be noted that these two 
worlds are produced in relation to each other. 
The difference between the gestures is an effect of 
the worlds in part created as much by the strip of 
orange paint as it is the movement of hands/arms. 
All these elements work together. Here there is a 
holding apart which is equally a holding togeth-
er. The work does not just inscribe an irreducible 
discontinuity into it, that irreducibility, the inter-
ruption of singular space, which parenthetically, 
as has already been argued, would be empathy’s 
condition of possibility, is its work. Here is the 
first opening to Walter Benjamin. It should be 
remembered that Benjamin’s most sustained treat-
ment of gesture occurs in his discussion of Brecht 
and in particular in his engagement with the par-
ticularity of Epic Theatre19. For Benjamin what is 
central to the latter is that the «art of Epic Thea-
tre consists in arousing astonishment rather than 
empathy [an der Stelle der Einfühlung das Staunen 
hervorzurufen]» (Benjamin [1980]: 535; [1992]: 
18)20. The gesture is linked therefore to a form 
of interruption. The gesture interrupts, separates 
and allows. The gesture refuses reconciliation and 
balance. Empathy is disavowed and, at the same 
time, «astonishment» as creation is affirmed. One 
works with the other. In the realm of theatre what 
this means is that tragedy and its demand for 
catharsis have been supplanted by a different the-
atrical force. (The question that emerges concerns 
what «astonishment» might mean within and as 
painting).
The interruption is provided with a remarkable 
formulation by Benjamin. After locating breaks 
within movement as mere continuity there are 
then points of arrest, stops, interruptions, on what 
Benjamin calls this «rock of astonishment». After 
noting the interruption and its emphatic presence 
Benjamin continues writing that «epic theatre»,
lets existence spray high from the bed of time 
and stand an instant shimmering in the void in 
order to bed it down anew [läßt das Dasein aus 
dem Bett der Zeit hoch aufsprühen und schillernd 
einen Nu im Leeren stehen, um es neu zu betten] 
(Benjamin [1980]: 531; [1992]: 13).
19 For an examination of some of the important issues 
raised by Walter Benjamin’s engagement with Brecht’s 
theatre see: Primavesi (1999) and Asman (1 April 1994).
20 Future references are to both texts. As opposed to Ben-
jamin, “empathy” for Warburg is central. It should not be 
forgotten that the 1893 text on Botticelli opens with an 
evocation of empathy. His argument is than «an aesthet-
ic act of empathy» has a determining effect of style. The 
footnote that Warburg adds refers to both Robert and 
Friedrich Theodor Vischer. See Warburg (2010): 39-40.
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This formulation warrants detailed attention. 
It knits together elements that are fundamental 
to any thinking of gesture. What it interconnects 
are three precise aspects of Benjamin’s account of 
gesture. Interruption is the first. The second is the 
process of continuity, which must be understood 
as a specific modality of repetition. Hence the first 
two elements in bringing interruption and repeti-
tion together demand an answer to the question 
concerning the modality of repetition that is at 
work within a setting created by «astonishment» 
and «interruption». The answer lies in the addi-
tion that the third element brings to the passage. 
It occasions an answer to the question. It inheres 
in the addition of the simple word «new [neu]». 
The passage allows for the interplay of «once 
again» and «newly [anew]» to create a setting 
in which the modality of repetition that enjoins 
alterity is at work. The contention has to be there-
fore that where Epic Theatre differs from tragedy 
(perhaps tragedy more generally construed) is in 
terms of a return in which the «new» is no longer 
a repetition of the Same. It is that conception of 
the «new» that sunders both time as mere pas-
sage and time as eternal return. This is precisely 
the point made by Benjamin when he argues that 
«interruption is one the fundamental methods 
of all form giving [daß das Unterbrechen eines 
der fundamentalen Verfahren aller Formgebung 
ist]» (Benjamin [1980]: 536; [1992]: 19). While 
this can be developed in the context of theatre, 
and it is decisive for Benjamin in distinguishing 
between tragedy and epic theatre, the question to 
be addressed concerns the viability of this think-
ing in the realm of painting. This question signals 
an important move. It allows art’s work priority in 
the precise sense that material difference has to be 
maintained. 
To return to Degas what is meant by the dou-
bling of gesture – and this will open up the work 
of Signorelli to be taken up next – is linked to the 
creation of form. While it may involve taking Ben-
jamin’s formulation beyond it immediate context, 
form creation, once positioned within an account 
of drawing or painting, is connected to the crea-
tion of a spacing which in occurring becomes part 
of the conditions of possibility for meaning. The 
meaning of the private arises as a result of its simul-
taneous presence with the literal gesture that opens 
and sustains the public. They are apart from each 
other whilst also being a part of the same work. 
Fundamental here is a decisive sense of at-the-
same-timeness that sustains an irreducible spacing 
at its centre. A claim whose force is interpretive; a 
force that arises once the project of interconnect-
ing understanding and empathy is put to one side. 
The work of the orange strip – which could also 
be understood as the work of colour as gesture – is 
also implicated in form creating. It works to pro-
duce a setting created by its own irreducibility. The 
spacing is a locus of activity that incorporates an 
endlessly negotiable threshold. It is an interstitial 
setting formed and informed by both. 
5.
To continue: Signorelli’s painting, which can 
be dated to around 1512, is linked, it might be 
conjectured, to a fundamental moment in the 
Christian Bible, namely Matthew 26:26. It gives 
it a form of visual presence. As significantly it 
depends upon another process of in-carnation: 
Now as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and after 
blessing it broke it and gave it to the disciples, and 
said: «Take, eat; this is my body [τοῦτο ἐστί τό σῶμα 
μου]» (Matthew 26: 26).
The text presents, in narrative form, the divi-
sion of what would have been the «bread» at the 
Passover feast. The bread becomes the body. One 
thing became another. Judas does not figure in the 
verse. However, what is presented as the betrayal 
appears21. The concerns of the painting therefore 
21 The question of the betrayal is more complex than it 
first appears. While in this instance the betrayer is sin-
gularized. As been argued elsewhere Peter also betrayed 
Christ. For an interpretation of Andrea del Castagno’s 
Last Supper in terms of the doubling of betrayal see 
Dunlop (2015): 138. While this betrayal does not deploy 
the same terminology, it could also be understood as an 
instance of the doubling of gesture. 
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bring a different division into play precisely because 
there is another staging of space in which, not only 
can separate textual occurrences be brought into a 
relation, it is equally the case that gesture and ges-
ture’s doubled presence are the result of processes of 
enacting – what has already been identified as the 
informing of form, the «more» that is always there 
within presentation – hence the painting demands 
that these relations be explored. As a result atten-
tion needs to be given to gesture and its doubled 
presence and thus to the way the work frames what 
emerges as a complex setting. Though it needs to 
be noted from the start that its elements – and thus 
the setting as a complex – pertain simultaneously, 
hence the centrality of at-the-same-timeness.
The painting stages two relations to the gift 
of the «host»22. Christ gives the gift – what will 
become the gift of his body – to one of the disci-
ples. Its acceptance is the sign of pure receptivity. 
The mouth is open to receive what will be given. 
Here there is the miracle of the gift that depends 
upon the host not simply harboring the possibil-
ity of transubstantiation. The transformative has 
occurred. The bread has become the body. The 
movement of the hand, the bread as Christ’s body 
and then the insertion of the host into the mouth 
of the disciple, when taken together comprise the 
gesture. No one element is meaningful outside 
a relation to another. This gesture is not simply a 
motif that is central to Christian religion since it is 
a restaging of the process of incarnation – perhaps 
the process in reverse – it can also be argued that 
what it brings with it is the question of presence, 
real presence and thus the relationship between 
the signifier and the signified. While this will be a 
theme that recurs, it is still possible to note that the 
host in its being given to the disciple stages ques-
tions and problems that remain at the very center 
of how the process of presentation, art included, 
is understood. The presence of the host stages the 
question of what it presents where presentation is 
22 Judas is obviously an essential figure within the his-
tory of anti-Semitism. His disavowal of the host also 
has a detailed history. For an analysis of both see Rigaux 
(1991).
both of itself and that which is other than itself. It 
is bread and yet it is the body of Christ. It is one 
thing and another. (Is art’s magic the magic of the 
host?). The relationship between the signifier and 
the signified while resolved in one direction, pre-
cisely because of other possibilities – one of which 
is there with Judas, which Judas could be taken 
as naming – that relationship remains an open 
question. Its apparent closure, the bread as host, 
is revealed as only ever an appearance because 
of Judas’ refusal hence the inscription of Judas as 
locus of necessary disavowal. 
In Signorelli’s painting Judas is hiding the host 
in a bag23. As a result the identity of bread as host 
is not longer stable. Policing will be necessary. 
Rather than look towards the Christ figures he 
looks towards the viewer of the painting; thus it is 
a mode of looking that defines the disciples. They 
become who they are as the result of a separation 
that imparts coherence. They are given in a rela-
tion, a relation that establishes the “brethren” and 
which is, of course, reinforced both by the figure 
of the host (thus the host as figure) as well as by 
its refusal. On one level access to the painting and 
thus to the Apostles as the companions of Jesus is 
via the mediating figure of Judas. At work here in 
this painting is a double movement that is struc-
tured around a form of exchange and thus the 
presence of a specific economy in which, while the 
bread is taken, it is not as though what is taken 
by Judas, as opposed to John, is the host. As has 
already been intimated, Judas takes the bread not 
the host (equally he takes the bread as the disa-
vowal of the host). The law of identity has come 
undone. In this gesture art’s self staging – the work 
staging itself as art – is enacted, and the world of 
magic exposed and thus simultaneously undone. 
Before pursuing the presence of this economy 
in Signorelli’s painting another instance will be 
noted. In this case it is an engraving by Hendrik 
Goltzius of The Last Supper (1585) (Figure 4). 
23 Dana E. Katz argues that Judas is attempting to «pro-
fane» the host. See Katz (2008): 33. For a study of the 
context leading up to the one in which the painting was 
undertaken see Todeschini (2010).
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(The print is based on an earlier painting by Pieter 
Coecke van Aelst) (Cleland [2014]: 23, 49).
What is remarkable in this engraving is the 
presence of Judas’ body. Again, the other dis-
ciples form a coherent group. How then is the 
incoherence, as it were, to be established? That it 
is Judas is clear from the pouch of money in his 
right hand. While he looks towards the figures at 
the table, none looks towards him. He is already 
distanced. The stool on which he leans is itself 
unstable. It is precarious. Then there is Judas’ 
body. His legs are turned towards the viewer. His 
right arm, noting of course that the right had 
holds the purse, bears his weight. His body is 
completely twisted. This is not an instance of the 
contrapossato that brings with it certain elegance 
(Summers [1977]). Here there is almost what 
mounts to a visual impossibility. The body of 
Judas is misaligned. This is his body as gesture. 
The misalignment compared to the other dis-
ciples who are related to each other in terms of 
comfort and ease means that this figure cannot 
be reconciled with any of the other bodies. That 
lack or rather impossibility of reconciliation cre-
ates a space. This is an antagonism on the level 
of gesture. It allows Judas’ body to be the gesture. 
There is a literal space created by the presence of 
the table. A divide is created.  Then there is the 
more symbolic division held in place by the fold 
in the tablecloth. It is as though the fold is the 
ineliminable divide in the fabric of what there is. 
The differences in question are not stated. They 
are seen. The tensions are a polarity without rec-
onciliation because of the way interruption fig-
ures here within a singular work of art. Moreo-
ver, any reconciliation would involve siding with 
either Judas or the Apostles. Again empathy – or 
more exactly its conditions of possibility – has 
been rendered inoperable by the work’s work. 
Except of course for that conception of empathy 
that can be had with victors (and thus never with 
“enemies”). To insist on empathy is to reduce the 
work to a series of reconciled positions. A posi-
tion that can be located throughout Warburg’s 
writings. Hence the account of Baldassare Peruz-
zi’s fresco on the ceiling of the Hall of Galatea in 
the Villa Farnesina takes as its point of departure 
the «desire for balance [die Sehnsucht nach Aus-
gleich]» that for Warburg was dominant within 
the «circle of Agostino Chigi» (Warburg [2010]: 
652)24. The latter commissioned the painting of 
the ceiling. «Balance [Ausgleich]» is a term that 
has both a prevailing ubiquity within the detail 
of Warburg’s analyses and the orientation of his 
more general project. While it would need to 
be argued in much greater detail than can be 
undertaken here, it can still be suggested that 
Warburg’s conception of a polarity – the hold-
ing together of that which is there in a form of 
opposition – is to escape the strains of conflict 
occasioning dissent in the name of an established 
consensus which, while allowing for the oppo-
sitional holds it within a reconciled form. Or 
24 For a detailed engagement with the ceiling as a whole 
see Lippincott (1990).
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at least this would be the desire, one that in the 
end demands a form of policing. Reconciliation 
based on the suppression of the friend/enemy 
distinction and which adopts the garb of neutral-
ity engenders a feint that is inherently unstable. 
Hence there is an important link to the project-
ed role of catharsis in tragedy; to which it might 
be added that for Benjamin and Brecht cathar-
sis stands opposed to the «interruption»25. This, 
it can be argued, is the radical point of separa-
tion between Warburg and Benjamin. This occurs 
of course in ways that elide the possibility of a 
consideration of polarities in terms of reconcilia-
tion and exposes them as sites of the triumphant 
and thus in relation to the construction of the 
enemy26. Here there is a return of astonishment 
within the work of art. It emerges from the expo-
sure of reconciliation’s presence as putative.
Returning to Signorelli it is clear that there is 
a similar sense of interruption – albeit one that is 
the result of an act of interpretation rather than 
affirmed by the work itself – insofar as interrup-
tion is that which resists or refuses any form of 
coherence other that the one imposed by perspec-
tive. And here it is essential to insist on the role 
played by perspective in terms of what has already 
been identified as form creation. This is how here 
mattering and form creation are linked. The recess 
of the arches is matched by both a similarity and 
a simultaneity of movement and presentation in 
the tiling on the floor. Depth is provided in both 
instances. Moreover, the receding tiles with the 
line dividing them in the middle creating the cen-
tre of the painting and thus in positioning Christ 
at that centre and thus locating him within and as 
the focal point allow the bodies that could then be 
positioned along axes created by lines that could 
be drawn from his body to the bottom left and 
25 On the question of the link between Warburg’s art his-
tory and the historical role of catharsis within the history 
of tragedy see Port (2004).
26 The nature of polarities is a vast topic within Warburg 
reception. The extent to which they are part of a process of 
a successful reconciliation or indicate a more complex pre-
dicament is taken up by Sigrid Weigel as part of her study 
of Warburg’s Schlangenritual analysis. See Weigel (1995).
right sides of the painting to be the same. (Not 
identical but the same). There is therefore a com-
plementarity of position within a form that is giv-
en. This is not form creation. On the contrary this 
is the form that is given. Enclosed within it are 
the gestures of Christ giving the host to John and 
Judas hiding the bread. This is the point at which 
the relation of non-relation between the gestures 
becomes central. This doubling of gesture undoes 
the unity of the framed – to which it should be 
added that it is the presence, the giveness, of that 
unity that becomes the precondition for its undo-
ing. At-the-same-timeness is the condition for 
showing anoriginal complexity. It forces a recon-
ciliation between that which cannot be reconciled 
other than through a forced reconciliation. There 
is therefore another opening thus another concep-
tion of form creation. 
To insist on the interruption staged by the 
impossibility of reconciliation is to concede that 
the history that this setting has obtained is struc-
tured by a series of forced reconciliations. Har-
mony should be neither naturalized nor construed 
as benign. If there is a doubling of gesture within 
the work and a full explanation would need to 
be attentive to the operative presence of materi-
als then that doubling signals the presence of a 
complex object that resists singularity except as 
produced. The effect of this position on an under-
standing of gesture involves working with the rec-
ognition that not only is there a division within 
a gesture, the apparently single gesture – Mary 
Magdalene on the Donatello pulpit – such that 
the truth of any one element involves both its irre-
ducibility to the other and thus its already pre-
sent relation to it, such a position has extension 
insofar as it also provides an exact description, at 
a certain level of abstraction, of the relationship 
between gestures within a single work or between 
gestures within works that are brought into a rela-
tion. What is significant therefore is the proposi-
tion that the truth of any one gesture only ever 
emerges in its relation, a relation of irreducibility 
to another gesture. Again, this is the doubling of 
gesture. That relation needs to be located within a 
setting in which forms of interruption predomi-
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nate. Namely, that irreducibility can be thought in 
terms of an interruption in which what is inter-
rupted is the singular space in which the attribu-
tion of a narrative quality to any one work of art 
took place. 
Finally, if there is a sense of form creating here 
then it has a twofold quality. Firstly, what occurs 
in the work is the impossibility of finality or self-
enclosure when the work is understood in terms of 
the relationship between gestures that themselves 
have to be understood as the interconnection of 
content and the means or medium of presentation 
identified by Hegel. Form as a quality of a work 
continues to be informed. (This is indetermination 
rather than determination). And then secondly, 
the way the doubling of gesture allows for other 
stagings of specific determinations of irreducibil-
ity. Relating one gesture to another, thus doubling 
as a form of continual interpretation remains an 
open possibility. These are relations that continue, 
and which are themselves allowed by the gesture’s 
maintaining its quality of a coming-into-relation 
(this is the futurity of the image). The doubling of 
gesture therefore is the work’s incompleting that is 
equally, and at the same time, its allowing.
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